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The term "partnership estates" is used to designate a cer-
tain class of resulting trusts. These particular resulting trusts
are classed with joint estates because, as a usual thing, the
legal title is held by all the members of a partnership as ten-
ants in common, and in equity, the partners are considered as
joint tenants for the purpose of administering the trust. But
the legal title is not necessarily held by all the members as ten-
ants in common; for it may be vested in one of the partners
as tenant in severalty; in which case there is not only the re-
sulting partnership trust, but an additional subordinate result-
ing trust to the partners as equitable tenants in common. The
legal title may be in one or in several. As will be shown, the
partners bear a two-fold relation to the beneficial interest in
the property; for each has a separate and distinct lien on the
property for any balance which may be found to be due him on
an accounting; and as to this lien, his interest is purely poten-
tial: the balance on an accounting having been paid, the
partners now own the residue of the beneficial interest as
tenants in common.
Land bought with partnership assets for partnership pur-
poses is held by the grantee or grantees of the legal estate, be
he or they one of tht partners, or all of them, or a third person,
upon a two-fold trust; and this trust gives rise to the term.
"partnership estates." All partnership assets are held in trust
to pay first, the partnership debts; and then, the partnership
balances. The trust character of partnership funds follows
them into the land, whereby the same trust is said to result
out of the land, from its purchase with trust funds, in favor of
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the beneficiaries of the fund. But the property is not necessar-
ily exhausted by these two beneficial interests, which are in the
nature of liens; and as soon as these liens are satisfied by the
payment of the partnership debts and the discharge of the part-
nership balances, equity removes the trust mantle from the
property, leaving the legal estate of the owners therein subject
to all the incidents of tenancy in common. W~here the property
is taken in the name of one of the partners or of athird person,
another trust results, prima facie, in favor of all the partners,
because they furnished the purchase money. But this resulting
trust is entirely distinct from the trust which is the partner-
ship estate. The latter arises by a conclusive presumption of
law from the application of partnership funds to the purchase
of the property. The former arises prima facie, from the ap-
plication of a common fund to the purchase; but it depends
upon the intention of the owners of the fund at the time of the
purchase. The presumption of this trust is rebuttable by
proof that the real intention at the time of the purchase,
was that both the legal and the beneficial interests should
be coincident.
The liens securing the payment of partnership debts and
balances are paramount to the rights, legal or equitable, of the
partners, simply as co-owners of the property, and are equally
paramount to all rights incidental to those of the partners as
co-owners. Thus, partnership debts and balances must be paid
before a partner's widow is entitled to have dower assigned in
her husband's share of the partnership land, whether his estate
therein be legal or equitable; or, perhaps, it would be better to
say that any assignment must be subject to the enforcement of
these claims; so that the widow of a partner is, in reality,
dowable only out of what remains of her husband's share af-
ter the payment of partnership debts and balances. In this
connection, partnership estates are said to be treated in
equity as personal property.
The lien of creditors upon the partnership land, however,
being mere security for the 'payment of their claims, must not
be enforced to the destruction of other rights in the land, if it
can be avoided. Therefore, when the personal assets of the
partnership are sufficient to pay the partnership debts, a cred-
itor cannot seek satisfaction out of the land. Moreover, the
lien of creditors is not specific-it is only a quasi lien, enforce-
able only in equity as against a trust, after the personal assets
have been exhausted.
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The objects of a partnership would be defeated if the part-
ners had not the power to deal with its property. Where,
therefore, in good faith, the character of the property is changed
from joint to separate; or is, in good faith, conveyed to a
stranger, the transfer will be upheld as against partnership
creditors. The quasi lien of creditors acquires no specific char-
acter until the actual institution of suit in equity to enforce
their claims. And creditors who buy in good faith for a valu-
able consideration, knowing the land to be partnership assets,
willnotbe held to see to the application of the purchase money.
A fortiori, one who buys land in ignorance of the fact that it is
partnership property takes it free from all liabilities of the part-
nership as such. But if the conveyance be voluntary, or be
made for the purpose of defeating partnership liabilities, to one
having actual notice of such intent, or to one to whom notice
of such intent must be imputed, the land will be held subject to
the enforcement of the partnership claims.
From the principles laid down, it naturally follows that
the trust for partnership purposes must be fully discharged by
payment of the partnership debts and settlement of balances
as between the partners before the creditors of an individual
partner can be permitted to subject his share to the payment
of their claims. It is only the surplus of a partner's share, af-
ter all partnership obligations are discharged, which stands
good for his individual debts; notwithstanding that such
debts have been secured by a specific lien on his interest; al-
ways excepting the case of a lienor who stands in the position
of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without
notice. And, in this respect, it matters not whether the legal
estate be in one partner or be held by a strangerin trust for the
partnership. Saving the rights of bona fide purchasers, the
legal estate must respond to the partnership liabilities.
Inasmuch as the partnership estate is a trust resulting out
of the purchase of the land, it matters not what the form of
the conveyance may be or whether it is sufficient to pass the
legal title. The facts being proved, equity will declare the trust
and compel the execution of the proper conveyances. A deed
to a name which is a mere trade-mark passes nothing in law;
but it will be sufficient to pass an equitable estate; and if it be
to a firm name which contains the full name of one partner, it
will pass the legal title to the partner named, who will hold in
trust for the partnership. Thus, where the conveyance was to
"S. L. & Co.," S. L. took the legal estate clothed with a trust
for the company. The partnership estate results irrespective of
the form of the deed; but a deed to the partners as tenants in
common, or to one of the partners as tenant in severalty, with-
out mentioning the partnership estate, will make it possible to
evade the partnership obligations in favor of a bona fide pur-
chaser; as where land was bought by a partnership but the
conveyance was made to one of the partners and he conveyed
it to one without notice in consideration of an obligatory
promise to marry him.
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